TRIENNIAL REVIEW: A NEW ERA FOR THE STATE-FEIDEAL
TELECOMMICATIONS PARTNERSHIP

Michael C. Engel*

I am making an eleventh hour request to encourage
you to allow the states needed jurisdiction over UNE-Ps.
Never in the past have states and the FCC had a greater
need for a complementary working relationship than
they have now. The Telecom Act of 1996 brought
about our strong working partnership. This is not the
time to take a step away and harness states with "one
size fits all" policies.'

On August 21, 2003, the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission") released its
long awaited Triennial Review Order which fundamentally changed the way the Commission and
state governments regulate local telephone competition. 2 This decision, which sets out a new
targeted fact-finding role for the states, signals a
new era of regulation which alters the way both
the Commission and the states gauge the ability of
competitors to enter the market without the use
of incumbent local exchange carrier ("LEC") facilities. In particular, where states previously were
able to expand the obligations of incumbent
* J.D. The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law, 1999. Mr. Engel is an Attorney-Advisor in the
Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau, Competition Policy Division. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Federal Communications Commission or the United States Government.
I Letter from Anne Boyle, Chair, Nebraska Public Service
Commission, to Jonathan Adelstein, Commissioner, Federal
Communications Commission (Feb. 14, 2003) (on file with
the author).
2 The Triennial Review proceeding was marked by deep
philosophical differences among the five commissioners, resuiting in a rare dissent from the Chairman, over which parts
of the incumbents' local network should be available to competitive LECs. Christopher Stern & Jonathan Krim, Divided
FCC Set to Force 'Bells' to Keep Sharing; Powell Opposing States'
Phone Role, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003, at El (describing the

LECs to make their networks available to competitors for leasing at wholesale rates, states will now
apply Commission-defined triggers to determine
whether certain pieces of the incumbent LECs'
networks should no longer be made available to
competitors." Thus, state commissions now have a
more focused role in determining when an incumbent LEC no longer has to unbundle a particular network element.
In 1996, Congress charged the Commission
with determining which parts of incumbent LEC
local telephone networks must be made available
at wholesale prices, or "unbundled," to new entrants, known as competitive LECs. 4 Section
251 (c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act") was designed to introduce competition into former local exchange monopolies by facilitating the entrance of competitive LECs that
could not otherwise afford to construct local netAct of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order and
Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC

Dkt. Nos. 01-338; 96-98; 98-147 (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter
Triennial Review Order] ("Few, if any, other requirements of
the 1996 Act have attracted so much regulatory attention, industry effort, or litigation, however, as the requirements
under Section 251 (c) (3) that [incumbent LECs] make elements of their networks available on an unbundled basis to
new entrants as cost-based rates.") Id. at para. 2; Review of
the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 22781, 22794, para.
27 (2001) [hereinafter Triennial Review NPRM] (asking how

controversy leading up to the Commission's Triennial Review

satellite, fixed wireless or mobile wireless should weigh in the
impairment analysis); see also Gayle Kansagor, et al., States to

decision); see also Mark Wigfield, Leading the News: FCC Chief
Faces Deregulation Setback, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A3

Play Major Role Under FCC Order, TRDAILY, Aug. 23, 2003, at 7
(describing the Triennial Review Order's discussion of states

(discussing the UNE-P controversy and the upcoming vote to
"give states more power to maintain current rules").
" See Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications

roles).
4 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending the Communications Act of
1934 codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (2000)
[hereinafter the Act].
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works from scratch into the market. 5 Without a
doubt, and as evidenced by seven non-stop years
of litigation at nearly every level of regulatory and
judicial fora, unbundling incumbent LEC networks has proven to be one of the most daunting
challenges the Commission has faced. Not only
must the Commission determine which parts of
the incumbents' networks, known as unbundled
network elements or "UNEs," can technically be
duplicated and to what extent such replication is
economically feasible, but the Commission is
forced to solve this equation in a fluid environment of rapidly changing technological developments and consumer demands. 6 Moreover, the
evolution of technologies such as cable telephony,
improved wireless service, and satellite may affect
the analysis of whether consumers already have
7
sufficient competitive choices.
Armed with over seven years of unbundling experience, the Commission, in response to the
D.C. Circuit's USTA v. FCC decision, conducted a
more detailed "granular" review of local market
conditions in order to assess competitive LECs
ability to deploy or purchase from alternative
sources, each piece of the local network. In the
Triennial Review Order, the Commission found
that, in certain instances, state commissions are
able to gather more detailed evidence regarding
the ability of competitive LECs to obtain certain
UNEs in various customer and geographic markets. 8 Specifically, state public utility commissions
are now empowered to conduct detailed fact-finding inquiries into the market conditions surrounding three key parts of the network: local
loops serving large business customers, local circuit switching, and transport.9 These three UNEs
generally represent the bulk of competitive LEC
infrastructure deployment, and therefore present
the greatest likelihood that competitors may not
be impaired without unbundled access to these elements.' 0 For the first time since 1996, the Coin5 SeeJoi rr STATEMENT OF MANAGERS, S. CONF. REP. No.
104-230, at 1 (2d Sess. 1996) (stating that the competitive
framework of the 1996 Act would benefit "all Americans by
opening all telecommunications markets to competition").
6 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 7 ("We
recognize that competition has evolved at a different pace in
different geographic markets and for different market segments."). Indeed, the proliferation of alternatives for consumers, such as cable telephony, wireless, and xDSL technologies, have radically changed the equation for determining
whether there is competition in the. local market. See, e.g., id.
at para. 52 (stating that, as of mid-2002, cable telephony rep-

mission's record demonstrates that, in certain
cases, competitors are able to economically deploy these facilities.
Section I of this article briefly summarizes the
Commission's significant post-1996 Act unbundling decisions, including a summary of the
Commission's most recent unbundling determinations in the Triennial Review Order. Section II
examines the Commission's authority to delegate
to the states the authority to perform the fact-finding inquiries needed to determine impairment
under the Commission's revised unbundling
rules. Section II also includes a broad discussion
of the ability of a federal agency to preempt the
states and an analysis of the Commission's authority to require state action. Finally, Section III considers the practical implications of the Commission's delegation to the states and considers some
of the issues that will likely be addressed in upcoming appeals of the Triennial Review Order.1

I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNBUNDLING

Section 251(d) (1) of the Act expressly grants
the Commission authority to establish regulations
implementing the requirements of the rest of Section 251, including Section 251(c) (3)'s requirement that incumbent LECs provide access, to any
requesting telecommunications carrier, to their
networks on an unbundled basis.' 2 In addition, although Section 251(d) (1) undoubtedly provides
the Commission with the authority to implement
unbundling regulations, the Act also preserves a
role for the states. Specifically, Section 251(d) (3)
of the Act permits states. to regulate unbundling
so long as the exercise of their authority does not
conflict with, or substantially prevent implementation of, the Commission's unbundling actions:
In prescribing and enforcing its regulations to implement the unbundling requirements .

.

. the Commis-

resented over 2.5 million access lines in 27 states); see also id.
at para. 53 (stating that, as of mid-2002, there were 129 million wireless subscribers).
7
See id. at para. 228 (recognizing that cable and wireless
technologies are increasingly competitive with incumbent
LEC local services).
8

See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 118.

9

See id. at paras. 187-88.

10

See generally id. at Parts VI.A (Loops), VI.C (Dedicated

Transport), VI.D (Local Circuit Switching).
II
12

See generally id. at paras. 3-6.

47 U.S.C. §251(d)(1) (2000).
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sion shall not preclude the enforcement of any regulation, order, or policy of a State Commission that(A) establishes access and interconnection obligations of local exchange carriers;
(B) is consistent with the requirements of this section; and
(C) does not substantially prevent implementation
of the requirements of this section and the purposes of this part.'

A.

The Local Competition Order

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 251(d) (1) of
the 1996 Act, the Commission created a national
list of network elements in the 1996 Local Competition Order that incumbent LECs must make available to new entrants on an unbundled basis. 14 In
general, applying Section 251 (d) (2) (B)'s ambiguous standard that competitors should have unbundled access to each piece of the incumbent
LEC's network that they would otherwise be "impaired" without, the Commission concluded that
competitive LECs would be impaired without access to essentially the entire incumbent LEC network.1 5 In addition to the national list, the Commission delegated to the states the authority to apply the Commission's interpretation of Section
251 (d) (2)'s "necessary" and "impair" standards to
require incumbent LECs to unbundle additional
network elements beyond the Commission's minimum national list.' 6 States, however, were not expressly denied the ability to take UNEs off the naId. §251(d)(3). Section 252(e) (3) generally preserves
13
the state's authority to review interconnection agreements:
Notwithstanding paragraph (2), but subject to Section
253, nothing in this Section shall prohibit a State commission from establishing or enforcing other requirements of State law in its review of an agreement, including requiring compliance with intrastate telecommunications service quality standards or requirements.
Id. §252(e) (3). Similarly, Section 261 preserves state regulations promulgated prior to, and after, the date of the Act,
provided that such requirements are "not inconsistent" with
the Act or the Commission's regulations. Id. §261(b)-(c).
14
See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt.
96-98, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order] (subsequent history omitted);
47 U.S.C. §251(d)(1) (2000) ("Within 6 months after the
date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
the Commission shall complete all action necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of [Section
251]."); Id. §251(d)(2) (directing the Commission to perform the "necessary and impair" analysis to determine what
UNEs should be made available to competitive LECs).
15 AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
16
Local Competition Order, supra note 14, at 15641-42, paras. 281-82; see also 47 C.F.R. §51.317(a) and (b) (1996) (pro-

tional list.'7
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board considered whether the
Commission had the authority to implement the
local telecommunications provisions of the 1996
Act.' 8 The Court held Congress had given the
Commission the authority to implement the local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act, including
the unbundling requirements of Section 251.'1'
Specifically, the Court found that Congress
granted the Commission full authority to regulate
local telecommunications, even though, in doing
so, Congress had "taken the regulation of local
telecommunications competition away from the
states." 20 The Court, however, vacated the Commission's interpretation of the "impair" standard
of Section 251 (d) (2) because it found that the Local Competition Order failed to include a "limiting
standard," and instead provided competitive LECs
with blanket access to the incumbent LECs' net-

works. 2 '
B.

The UNE Remand Order
In response to the Supreme Court's remand, in

1999 the Commission adopted the UNE Remand
Order.22 In addition to refining its interpretation
of the 1996 Act's impairment standard to provide
that impairment exists where lack of access to a
particular UNE "materially diminishes" a competividing that the state could decline to require unbundling of
the network element only if that network element did not
satisfy the applicable "necessary" or "impair" test).
17
See Local Competition Order, supra note 14, at 15566-68,
paras. 133-37.
18 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 374-75 (discussing the incumbents' arguments that the authority to implement the local competition provisions belonged, not to the Commission,
but to the states). Notably, no party challenged the Commission's conclusion that it could authorize the states to apply
those standards to require unbundling of additional network
elements under federal law. See Triennial Review Order, supra
note 3, at para. 182 (discussing the Iowa Utils. Bd. decision).
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 378.
Id. at 378 n.6; see alsoJonathan Galst, "Phony" Intent?:
An Examination of Regulatory-Preemption Jurisprudence, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 108, 150 (1992) (arguing that preemption decisions should be reserved for "institutions that are politically
accountable and possess the necessary expertise").
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388.
21
Implementation of the Local Competition Provision
22
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. 96-98, Third
Report and Order and Fourth FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Remand Order] (subsequent history omitted).
19

20
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tor's ability to provide service, the Commission
modified the language addressing the states' authority to create additional unbundling requirements in two ways.2 3 First, the UNE Remand Order
clarified the set of standards that states should apply. In particular, the UNE Remand Orderprovided
that "[a] state commission must comply with the
standards set forth in §51.317 [the codified version of the impairment standard] when considering whether to require the unbundling of addi24
tional network elements."

Second, the UNE Remand Orderprovided that although states could not remove UNEs from the
Commission's national list, a state could remove
unbundling requirements for a network element
that the state itself had previously added.2 5 Significandy, however, the Commission found that at
the time, for several policy reasons, states should
only be permitted to supplement the national
UNE list.26 Specifically, the Commission reasoned
that removal of unbundling requirements on a
state-by-state basis would threaten, "at least in the
near future," certainty in the marketplace and the
development of competition. 27 Further, a guaranteed national list would provide competitive LECs
with the certainty to develop and implement regional and national business plans. 28 The Commission also recognized that state-by-state review
of UNEs would lead to increased litigation at the
state level, which would unnecessarily burden the
parties with additional costs and delays. Most im23
See id. at 3725, para. 51 ("We find that a materiality
component, although it cannot be quantified precisely, requires that there be substantive differences between the alternative outside the incumbent LEC's network and the incumbent LEC's network element that, collectively, 'impair' a
competitive LEC's ability to provide service.").
24
47 C.F.R. §51.317(b)(4) (2002).
25
See UNE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3767, para.
154.
26
See id. ("We believe that section 251 (d) (3) grants state
commissions the authority to impose additional obligations
upon incumbent LECs beyond those imposed by the national
list, as long as they meet the requirements of section 251 and
the national policy framework instituted in this Order . . .
however, we find that state-by-state removal of elements from
the national list would substantially prevent implementation
of the requirements and purposes of this section."). Originally, in the 1996 Local Competition Order, the Commission
held that "[s]tate commissions may identify network elements to be unbundled, in addition to those elements identified by the Commission." Local Competition Order, supra note
14, at para. 136 (codified at 27 C.F.R. §51.317 (2003)).
27 UNE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3768-69, para.
158.
28
See id. at 3769, para. 159.
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portantly, however, the Commission did not foreclose future state-by-state UNE consideration, but
instead premised its decision on present market
conditions. 29 Thus, the Commission clearly left
open the possibility of revisiting its nationwide
UNE policy.
It should be noted that, from a practical standpoint, due to the UNE Remand Order's expansive

unbundling requirements, the policy of allowing
states to add only UNEs to the national list had
limited utility. Because virtually every piece of incumbent LEC physical network was already unbundled under the Commission's rules, little was
left for the states to consider. These options include requiring incumbent LECs to offer "new"
unbundled loop-transport combinations, known
as "EELs," where previously competitors were required to first purchase a retail priced "special access" circuit then convert that circuit to a UNE,
and unbundling switching in the few dense urban
areas where incumbent LECs were not otherwise
required to provide unbundled access to switch30
ing.
C.

United States Telecom Association v. FCC
On May 24, 2002, in United States Telecom Associa-

tion v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit addressed both the
UNE Remand Order and the Commission's rules requiring the unbundling of line sharing. 3' The
USTA court found the Commission's analysis in
See id. at 3769-70, paras. 160-61.
:
See, e.g., Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Oblig:tions of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Initial Comments of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Com29

missioners, to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Dkt. Nos.

01-92, 96-98, 98-147, at 8 n. 16 (Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter
Comments to Triennial Review Order]; see also James M.
Tobin & Mary E. Wand, Competition in Local Telephone Services:
California's Experience in Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 791, 794-806 (1998) (dis-

cussing the California Public Utilities Commission's early
proceedings implementing the 1996 Act).
41 United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415
(D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. WorldCom, Inc. v.
United States Telecom Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 1571 (2003). Subsequent to the UNE Remand Order the Commission determined
that incumbent LECs must also unbundle the high-frequency
portion of the local loop to requesting carriers. Deployment
of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt
Nos. 98-147, 96-98, Third Report and Order in CC Dkt. No. 98-
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the UNE Remand Order lacking in several respects,
the resolution of which implicates many aspects of
the Triennial Review proceeding. Specifically, with
regard to the Commission's unbundling rules, the
USTA court was concerned that the Commission's
rules were too national in scope, despite variation
in competitive conditions and revenue opportunities around the country. In finding fault with the
Commission's adoption of a "uniform national
rule" mandating nationwide access to most UNEs,
the USTA court held that Section 251 (d) (2) requires "a more nuanced concept of impairment"
that takes into account possible variations in impairment in different geographic and customer
markets.3 2 The USTA court, however, did not
question the authority of the Commission to order nationwide unbundling rules-the court
questioned only the Commission's broad analysis
3
of the nationwide market conditions.
D.

The 7iennial Review Order
Charged by the D.C. Circuit in USTA with the

147 and Fourth Report in CC Dkt. No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd.
20912, 20916, para. 5 (1999) [hereinafter Line Sharing Order].
The court remanded the UNE Remand Order to the Commission for further consideration and stated that "the Line Sharing Order must be vacated and remanded." USTA, 290 F.3d at
429. The USTA court faulted the Commission for failing to
consider the existence of intermodal competition in the market for broadband services before requiring incumbents to
unbundle the high-frequency portion of the loop. See USTA,
290 F.3d at 428-29.
32 See USTA, 290 F.3d at 426.
33 See id. at 422 (reasoning that, without considering the
level of impairment in any particular geographic market and
customer class, the Commission's rules would result in UNEs
being "available to [competitive LECs] in many markets
where there is no reasonable basis for thinking that competition is suffering from any impairment of a sort that might
have the object of Congress's [sic] concern").
M See Tiennial Review NPRM, supra note 3, at 22815-16,
paras. 75-76. The Commission also considered and rejected
the argument that states have separate unbundling authority
tinder Section 271. Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at
para. 659 ("So if, for example, pursuant to section 251, competitive entrants are found not to be 'impaired' without access to unbundled switching at TELRIC rates, the question
becomes whether BOCs are required to provide unbundled
switching at TELRIC rates pursuant to section
271 (c) (2) (B) (vi)."). Section 271 sets out a checklist that requires Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") to offer nondiscriminatory access to, for example, local loops and switching
in order to receive authority to provide in-region interLATA
service. See 47 U.S.C. §271 (2000); see also United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub
nora., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (restricting BOCs from providing service for calls between

task of analyzing customer and geographic markets on a far more detailed level to determine
whether unbundling should be required, the
Commission considered in the Triennial Review
proceeding the extent to which state commissions
can assist in analyzing local market conditions in
order to create, remove, and implement Unbundling requirements. 3 4 Most importantly, the
TriennialReview Orderrefines the Commission's interpretation of Section 251 (d) (3)'s "impairment"
standard to consider the degree that competitive
LECs are "economically" hindered in entering the
local market.3 5 In addition to revising the impairment standard from the UNE Remand Order's "materially diminish" standard to consideration of a
defined list of economic barriers to entry, the new
standard, forged by seven years of competitive
LEC experience, considers evidence of actual deployment in the marketplace as proof that deployment is economically feasible. 3" Evidence of actual marketplace deployment is the most persuasive evidence in the new impairment analysis with,
for example, the Commission basing findings of
LATAs). In rejecting arguments that BOCs should be treated
differently than non-BOC incumbent LECs when Section 251
unbundling requirements are lifted, the Commission reasoned that Congress "could not have intended the [Section
271] checklist to render section 251 itself superfluous." 7"rennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 660. Nonetheless,

the Commission held that BOCs must continue to make the
checklist elements that are no longer unbundled under Section 251 available, not at the TELRIC wholesale prices, but at
'just and reasonable" prices and on a nondiscriminatory basis
under Sections 201 and 202 of the 1996 Act. Id. at para. 664.
35

Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 84 ("We

find a requesting carrier to be impaired when lack of access
to an incumbent LEC network poses a barrier or barriers to
entry, including operational and economic barriers, that are
likely to make entry into a market uneconomic.").
36
By way of background, in the TriennialReview proceeding, the BOCs generally argued that the states should have a
limited role and that the Commission should find nationwide
that competitive LECs are not impaired without access to
many existing unbundled network elements, particularly
switching, high-capacity loops, and dedicated transport. See
Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 192 n. 609 (re-

jecting incumbent LEC arguments that states are preempted
from regulating local telecommunications); see also id. at
para. 196 n. 619 (summarizing Verizon's argument that increased state participation would create greater uncertainty
due to the establishment of differing state decisions). On the
other hand, the IXCs and competitive LECs advocated for an
expanded state role in the unbundling process and, specifically, that carriers are impaired without access to the elements listed above and all other existing elements. See id. at
para. 192 n. 610 (rejecting arguments that states may implement an unbundling regime under state law, regardless of
federal law).
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impairment on the number of competitors that
have deployed a certain type UNE in a geographic
market. 3 7 In sum, the revised impairment analysis,
with its increased fact-finding requirements, is to
be applied by both the Commission and the states
to create a consistent set of unbundling regulations that are tailored to the individual characteristics of each customer and geographic market.
For certain UNEs, such as enterprise loops, circuit switching, and transport (and the other UNEs
such as shared transport and signaling networks
that are available only if circuit switching is unbundled) the Commission has asked the states to
conduct a granular fact-finding inquiry, under
specific deadlines, to determine whether impairment exists.3 8 For other UNEs, such as mass market loops, line sharing, and packet switching, the
Commission has made a final unbundling determination, and states may not increase or decrease
unbundling obligations with respect to those elements. 39 Notably, in order to minimize customer
and market disruptions, where the Commission
has removed unbundled access to an incumbent
LEC facility that is presently unbundled, such as
line sharing, the Commission provides a transition mechanism to avoid customer and market
disruptions. 4° For example, although the Commission has removed line sharing from the UNE
list, existing line sharing providers have up to
three years to continue to obtain customers at
wholesale rates. 41 After the three year period
runs, however, competitive LECs will either serve
their xDSL customers with the competitive LEC's
42
own facilities or develop a new business model.
The lynchpin of the states' role is the Commis37

See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 93.

'38 See id. at para. 7 (summarizing the role of the states).
39
See id. (describing the unbundling determination for
each UNE).
40
See id. at para. 264. In order to prevent further disruption in the line sharing context, the Commission decided to
grandfather existing line sharing arrangements until the
Commission's next biennial review commencing in 2004. See
id.
41
42

See Triennial Review Order,; supra note 3, at para. 264.
See id. at para. 265.

43 See, e.g., id. at para. 328 (describing the triggers for local loops serving enterprise customers). While the Triennial
Review Orderundoubtedly will require the states and the Commission to maintain an open dialogue, the Commission rejected the request of many state commissions to convene a
federal/state joint conference on unbundling requirements
pursuant to Section 410(b) of the 1996 Act before promulgating new rules. See id. at para. 187 n. 597. The Commission reasoned that convening a federal/state joint confer-

sion's "trigger" tests that the state commissions apply to determine whether competitive LECs are
43
impaired without access to a particular UNE.
Realizing the resources and the institutional
knowledge that states have of their respective customer and geographic markets, the Commission
reasoned that, where a network element's inherent economic characteristics differ based on a
geographic area or customer class served, the
states are better positioned to conduct a detailed
fact-finding inquiry to determine if these triggers
are met.44 One such trigger, for example, is con-

tained in the analysis of dedicated transport.
Under the transport triggers, states will make detailed findings of the number of transport providers on each particular route. 45 If a certain number
of competitive providers are present, or a certain
number of wholesale alternatives (other than the
competitive LEC) are available, then incumbent
LEC transport on that particular route will no
longer be unbundled.

46

In short, based on the D.C. Circuit's guidance
that the Commission magnify its analysis of local
market conditions to be more "granular," this new
impairment standard analysis considers several additional "barriers to entry" that make competitive
entry in a particular market uneconomic. 47 Moreover, the Commission's new impairment analysis
not only considers supply-side factors such as scale
economies, sunk costs, and first mover advantages, but also considers demand-side factors such
as the particular needs of the business market (referred to as the "Enterprise Market") and the residential market (referred to as the "Mass Market") 48 Set out below are brief summaries of the
ence would unnecessarily delay the Commission's implementation of the USTA decision. See id.
44 See id. at para. 7.
45

See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 394-

418; see also id. at para. 396 ("We conclude that a route-specific bright-line standard is more manageable for the parties
and administratively more practical [than a general analysis
of market power].").
46
As discussed below, due to the fact-intensive nature of
this analysis, an issue arises in the event that a state declines
to perform this analysis or does not perform it within the
specified period of time. If this happens, the Commission
may be required to perform the very analysis which it determined that it was not in the best position to conduct.
47

Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 7.

See id. at para. 75 (describing how economic factors
such as "sunk costs, scale economies, scope economies, absolute cost advantages, capital requirements, first-mover advantages, strategic behavior by the incumbents, product differentiation, long-term contracts, and network externalities" act as
48
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Triennial Review Order's key UNE determinations
describing whether that UNE is available on an
unbundled basis, and what role the states play
49
with respect to that element:
"
Mass Market Local Loops: All 2-wire and
4-wire analog and digital copper local
loops are unbundled. 5 11 "Hybrid" local
loops that are time division multiplexed
5*
("TDM-based") are subject to unbundling.
52
Packet-switched loops are not unbundled.
Fiber-to-the-home loops are generally not
53
unbundled.
* Line Sharing: 5 4 Unbundling of line sharing
is phased out over three years. 55 States generally have no role with regard to determining impairment for this UNE.
• Enterprise Market Local Loops: OCn level
local loops are no longer unbundled. 56 Dark
fiber loops, DS3 loops (limited to 2 DS3
loops per competitive LEC per customer location) and DS1 loops are unbundled, except where states determine that impairment does not exist using the Commission's
barriers to entry).
49
For the sake of brevity, technical descriptions of the
functions of each UNE are omitted. Each of the three
landmark Commission orders discussed herein, the Local
Competition Order,the UATE Remand Orderand the Triennial Re-

view Order, provide extensive discussion of each element's
function and its place in the local network architecture.
50
Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 249 (noting that "no party seriously asserts that stand-alone copper
loops should not be unbundled in order to provide services
to the mass market"). Previously, the Commission declined
to incorporate distinctions based on loop-capacity levels in its
rules. UNE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3777, para. 176.
The Triennial Review Order revises the local loop rules to incorporate several local loop categories, both based on general capacity and make-up of the loop, for example, whether
certain parts of the loop are copper or fiber. See Triennial
Review Order, supra note 3, at paras. 197, 200.
51
See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 213.
52
See id. at paras. 292-94. The Commission also concluded, under its Section 706 analysis, that the costs of unbundling packet-switched local loops would outweigh the potential benefits of unbundling. See id. at para. 295.
53 See id. at 273 (for fiber-to-the-home loops that have
been built over top of existing copper network (this is also
known as an overbuild or a brownfield build), incumbent
LECs must make available a copper loop or provide 64 kbps
channel over the fiber-to-the-home loop).
54
Line sharing occurs when the incumbent LEC offers
voice service to the customer, and the competitive LEC leases
the high frequency portion of the loop, typically to provide
xDSL service. See id. at para. 255. Arguably the two most
hotly contested UNEs in the Tiennial Review proceeding
were line sharing and circuit switching. Circuit switching was
controversial because it is the centerpiece of UNE platform
("UNE-P") providers, competitive LECs that represent a sig-

"

"triggers," i.e., states can remove these loops
if the triggers are met.5 7 States must conduct
this inquiry within nine months of the
5
effective date of the Triennial Review Order. 1
Subloops: Incumbent LECs must offer national unbundled access to subloops necessary to access wiring at or near multiunit
customer premises..5 9 This requirement in-

cludes inside wire and applies to all types of
capacity level and loops. 60
o Network Interface Devices ("NIDs"): Incumbent LECs must offer unbundled access to
NIDs on a stand-alone basis to competitive
LECs. 6 1 States generally have no role with

regard to determining impairment for this
UNE.
o Dedicated Transport: Transport is redefined
to include only transmission facilities that
connect incumbent LEC switches and wire
centers-entrance facilities/backhaul between incumbent LEC end office and competing LEC points of presence are not un-

nificant portion of the competitive LEC industry amounting
to approximately 7.5 million lines in 2002. See id. at para. 41
n. 130 (describing UNE-P as a combination of the loop,
switching, and shared transport UNEs). Generally, without
local circuit switching, UNE-P providers would either have to
deploy their own switch or purchase switching from another
provider. For practical purposes, line sharing was controversial because the removal of it as a UNE greatly alters the business plans of competitive LECs that focus on xDSL. Without
the ability to acquire the high frequency portion of the incumbent LECs' local loops, these companies argued that
they would be unable to either build the lines themselves or
purchase the element from a wholesale source. See id. at
para. 255.
55 Line splitting, which is where two competitive LECs
split the loop into narrowband and broadband services, must
be supported by the incumbent LEC. See id. at para. 211.
56 See id. at para. 315. The Commission found persuasive
the fact that competitive LECs have actually deployed OCn
loops to commercial buildings. See id. Also, the TriennialReview record shows that "there does not appear to be any evidence of demand for incumbent LEC OCn level unbundled
loops." See id. at para. 315.
57

See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at paras. 298-

342. The Commission's triggers consider, among other factors, whether self-provisioning is feasible, as evidenced by existing deployment by competitive LECs, and whether wholesale alternatives other than the incumbent LEC are available.
The Commission's rules provide when specific numbers of
each of these alternatives are available, then that loop-type is
no longer unbundled in that market.
58 See id. at para. 339.
59
60

57.
61

See id. at para. 347.
See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at paras. 343See id. at paras. 356-58.
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bundled.6 OCn level transport is no longer
unbundled. 6- Dark fiber, DS3 (DS3s are limited to twelve per competitive LEC per
route) and DS1 facilities are unbundled, except where states determine that, on a routeby-route basis, impairment does not exist using the Commission's "triggers," i.e., states
can remove transport if the triggers are

process"), or where states determine that
such a process is unnecessary, i.e., competitive LECs could economically deploy switching even without a batch hot cut process in
place.7 2 States must conduct this inquiry
within nine months of the Triennial Review
Order.73 States may also remove mass market

circuit switching where certain triggers are
met (similar to loops and transport) .7
Lastly, states may consider whether temporary availability of mass market switching
cures impairment, e.g., a state may consider
if the availability of unbundled switching to
the competitive LEC for the first ninety days
it has the customer is enough to cure impairment, rather than leaving mass market
circuit switching unbundled for the indefi-

met. 64 States must conduct this inquiry

within nine months of the effective date of
the Triennial Review Order.65 Once the initial

state proceedings are completed, states may
conduct further reviews to identify additional transport routes that satisfy the trig66
gers.
" Circuit Switching for the Enterprise Market:
Circuit switching at the DS1 and above capacity levels is no longer unbundled for customers served by DS1 capacity and above
loops. 6 7 States, however, may rebut this find-

ing and require unbundling of enterprise
switching. 68 States must perform this inquiry
within ninety days of effective date of the
TriennialReview Order.69 States must make an
affirmative finding of impairment in a particular market and petition the Commission
for a waiver of the finding of no impairment.

70

" Circuit Switching for the Mass Market: Circuit switching at the DSO level remains unbundled on a nationwide

basis. 7'

States,

however, may remove the unbundling requirements in markets where incumbent
LECs are able to transfer mass quantities of
loops (referred to as a "batch hot cut
62
See id. at para. 365 (finding that Section 251 "does not
require incumbent LECs to unbundle transmission facilities
connecting incumbent LEC networks to competitive LEC
networks for the purpose of backhauling traffic").
63
See id. at para. 359.
64
See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 359.
The transport triggers generally parallel the loop triggers in
that the state commission must consider both potential deployment, by analyzing the number of competitive LECs that
have built facilities over that route, and the availability of
competitive wholesale providers. See id. at paras. 405, 412.
See id. at para. 417.
65
66 See id. at para. 418 (noting States have six months from

the filing of a petition to complete these further reviews).
67
See id. at paa. 419. The UNE Remand Order set out a
"carve-out" whereby circuit switching serving four-line DSO
customers in zone one of a top 50 MSA was not unbundled.
INE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3828-31, paras. 290-98.
The Triennial Review Order maintains this requirement on an
interim basis whereby state commissions must determine
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nite future.

75

*

Shared Transport: Remains unbundled, but
only to the extent circuit switching remains
unbundled. 7" Thus, the states' decisions for
the circuit switching UNE control whether
shared transport is unbundled.
77
* Packet Switching: No longer unbundled.
This applies to packet switching, routers,
and Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers ("DSLAMs") .7 States generally
have no role with regard to determining impairment for this UNE.
* Signaling Networks: Unbundled, but only
where a competitive LEC purchases circuit
switching. 79 Other than the connection with
circuit switching, states generally have no
role with regard to determining impairment
for this UNE.
within nine months, by applying Commission triggers,
whether these customers could economically be served by a
DS1 or higher capacity loop. Id. at para. 525.
68
TriennialReview Order, supra note 3, at para. 455.
69 See id. States may also revisit whether competitive
LECs are impaired without access to unbundled local circuit
switching serving the enterprise market; these subsequent reviews must be completed within six months of the filing of a
petition. See id.
70
See id.
71
See id. at para. 459.
72
See id. at paras. 459, 488, 506-07.
73 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 488.
74
See id. at paras. 498-505.
75
See id. at para. 521.
76
See id. at paras. 533-34.
77 See id. at para. 537.
78
See TriennialReview Order, supra note 3, at para. 537.
79
See id. at paras. 542-45.
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*

Call-Related Databases: Unbundled if the
competitive LEC also purchases unbundled
switching.8 0 Also, if the incumbent LEC
does not provide customized routing, then
operator services and directory assistance
services are also available. 8 ' Other than the
connection with circuit switching, states generally have no role with regard to determining impairment for this UNE.
* Operations Support Systems ("OSS")
Functions: OSS generally consists of
pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing functions
supported by the incumbent LEC.8 2 OSS is
unbundled nationwide for qualifying ser83
vices.
" UNE Combinations: Loop-transport combinations (known as enhanced extended
links, or "EELs") are unbundled, subject to
that circuit meeting certain service eligibility
criteria. 84 Competitive LECs may convert
special access services to EELs and may also
purchase new EELs.8 5
II.

THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO
RESTRICT AND DELEGATE STATE
UNBUNDLING

Several challenges lie ahead for the Commission's Triennial Review rules. Significantly, courts
will likely be forced to consider whether the Commission has the authority to preempt the states
from employing their own impairment triggers.
See id. at para. 551.
See id. at para. 560. The Commission also held that
customized routing must be provided in a manner that allows
competitive LECs to "efficiently access" either the competitive LEC's or a third party's Operator Service/Directory Assistance platform. See id. at para. 560 n. 1735.
82
See id. at para. 561.
83
See TriennialReview Order, supra note 3, at para. 566.
84
See id. at para. 575. In order to obtain an EEL, a competitive LEC must have state authorization to provide local
voice service, local voice service must be provide over each
circuit, including local number assignment and E911 capability, and various architectural safeguards must be met that
generally ensure that the EEL is not used to circumvent special access services. See id. at paras. 590-611.
85
See id. at paras. 569-626. Formerly EELs were typically
obtained by first purchasing a special access circuit then converting that circuit to an EEL, thus reducing the cost for that
circuit, but also incurring a penalty to cancel the special access contract.
86
Chairman Powell and Commissioner Abernathy both
ask, in their separate statements to the TriennialReview Order,
whether these factors are adequately defined for the local cir80
81

To date, the Triennial Review Order represents the
Commission's most rigorous and defined set of
procedures regarding UNEs that states must
follow. That is, states choosing to participate in
the UNE analysis may only, under the Commission's rules, consider a defined set of factors in
reaching their determinations.8 6 Below is a discussion of the Commission's authority, as a federal
agency acting on congressionally delegated authority, to preempt the states from deviating from
the Commission's defined fact-finding tests.
A.

General Preemption Authority of Federal
Agencies.

The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law.8 7 In LouisianaPublic Service Commission v. FCC, the Supreme Court set out the analysis
for determining whether Congress or a federal
agency has lawfully preempted state authority. 88
Generally, preemption of state law occurs where
"Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses
a clear intent to pre-empt state law."8 9 Further,
"pre-emption may result not only from action
taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting
within the scope of its congressionally delegated
authority may pre-empt state regulation." 90
B.

Commission Authority Under the 1996 Act
to Create Nationwide Unbundling Rules.
Section 201(b),

a 1938 amendment to the

cuit switching UNE. See generally TriennialReview Order, supra
note 3, Separate Statements of Commissioners Michael K.
Powell and Kathleen Q. Abernathy in CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338,
96-98, 98-147, FCC 03-36 (Aug. 21, 2003).
87

U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2 ("the Laws of the United

States . ..shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
88 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355
(1986) (addressing the Commission's authority, prior to
1996, to preempt state regulation over depreciation of property for intrastate rate making purposes).
89
See id. at 368. Congress may also preempt state authority,
[w]here there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, compliance with both federal and
state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is
implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation,
where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no
room for the States to supplement federal law, where or
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress.
Id. at 368-69.
90
See id.
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Communications Act of 1934, confers rulemaking
authority on the Commission: "The Commission
may prescribe such rules and regulations as may
be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this chapter." 91 The 1996 Act left
this Section intact and in Iowa Utils. Bd., the Supreme Court held that Section 201 (b) explicitly
gives the Commission jurisdiction to make rules
governing matters to which the 1996 Act applies.9 2 As discussed above, the Iowa Utils. Bd.
Court upheld the Commission's authority to
create pricing rules, emphasizing that there can
be no question "whether the Federal Government
has taken the regulation of local telecommunications competition away from the states .. . [because] it unquestionably has." 93 Although he disagreed that the Commission had been given clear
authority to create pricing rules, Justice Thomas,
in his concurring opinion, explained: "Section
251 specifically identifies those subjects upon
which the Commission may regulate. The Commission has authority to regulate . .. those network elements that the carrier must make available on an unbundled basis for purposes of
94
§251 (c)."

In Iowa Utils. Bd., numerous parties challenged
the Commission's TELRIC rule arguing that it displaced the states' authority to "establish" or approve rates in arbitration proceedings under the
1996 Act.9 5 The Supreme Court, however, upheld
the TELRIC rule as a legitimate exercise of the
Commission's rulemaking authority under Section 201 (b) of the Act. 96 Specifically, the Court
held that the Commission has broad jurisdiction
91

47 U.S.C. §201 (b) (2000).

92

See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 377-78.

93 Id. at 378 (holding that state application of the Commission's pricing methodology "is enough to constitute the
establishment of rates"). Cf John E. Taylor, AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Board: The Supreme Court Recognizes Broad FCCJurisdiction Over Local Telephone Competition, 78 N.C. L. REv.
1645, 1698 (2000) (arguing that "textual analysis slightly favors the conclusion that the state commissions should be free
to develop their own pricing methodologies under the 1996
Act").
94 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 406.
95
See id. at 382; see also Michael L. Gallo, AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Board, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 417, 423-24 (arguing that establishing rates "could be interpreted to mean
merely implementing the FCC's mandatory pricing policy").
96 See Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. at 385 (holding that
"the Commission has jurisdiction to design a pricing
methodology").
97

See id.

98

Id. at 413 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
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under the 1996 Act to prescribe a pricing methodology that the states could then take and "establish" rates by applying and implementing the
97
TELRIC methodology.
Similarly, the key issue in the Triennial Review
proceeding is whether the Commission has the
authority to restrict the analysis that the states will
apply to add or remove UNEs in light of Section
251 (d) (3) which preserves state authority to "establish" unbundling obligations. 98 Here, as in
Iowa Utils. Bd., the Commission has prescribed a
methodology that the states will use to reach certain conclusions, i.e., establish unbundling determinations, by conducting detailed fact-finding inquiries. With unbundling, as in the pricing rules
at issue in Iowa Utils. Bd., the statute reserves the
"establish" function for the states. 99 As Justice
Thomas noted, however, the key difference with
unbundling is that, via Sections 251(c) and (d),
the Commission has clear authority to prescribe
unbundling rules. 10 0 Thus, because the Commission's pricing rules were upheld, even in light of
the fact that states traditionally exercised plenary
authority over pricing, it follows, afortiori,that the
Commission's explicit statutory authority to implement unbundling allows it to both limit state
unbundling activity, which cannot be said to be a
traditional state function, and to prescribe specific guidelines for the states' analysis that is consistent with the Commission's overall implementation of Section 251.101
The remaining issue then is whether the Commission may require the states to perform an unbundling analysis, or whether the Commission
Commission was stripping states of a "traditional local
ratemaking" function). Here, unbundling is not a traditional
function of the states-prior to the creation of the competitive local market by the 1996 Act, unbundling generally did
not exist.

99

47 U.S.C. §251 (d) (3).
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 406-07.
47 U.S.C. §251 (d) (3); see also Triennial Review Order,
supra note 3, at para. 187 (finding that the states "do not have
plenary authority under federal law to create, modify or eliminate unbundling obligations"); see also Gallo, supra note 95,
at 419. (discussing the authority that state public utility commissions traditionally held over the regulation of intrastate
telecommunications services). Previously, the Commission
and the states engaged in limited sharing in the context of
cable regulation. Arthur H. Harding & Paul W. Jamieson,
Dismantlingthe FinalRegulatory Entry Barriers:A Cal for the FCC
to Assert Its Preemptive Authority, 12 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 533,
555 (1999) (describing the Commission's recognition in the
1970's of the valuable role states play in the franchising
process).
100
101
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may only request that the states perform the
analysis. 10 2 Generally, a state's participation in carrying out federal telecommunications regulation
is not mandatory. 0 3 For example, if a state commission declines or fails to participate in arbitration or review of interconnection agreements, responsibility for regulation falls to the Commission. That is, there is no requirement or obligation in federal law that a state participate in this
regulation. Further, a state or state commission's
decision not to act is generally not subject to review.10 4 The state commission is "free to accept or
reject such participation as a gratuity without
abstaining from any lawful activity within its
power."10 5 A state commission may simply decline
the invitation to regulate local competition on behalf of the federal government and allow that
power to return to the Commission. 0 6 In sum,
while Congress can obtain a state's voluntary consent to federal jurisdiction, Congress cannot
"commandeer" state regulatory agencies. ' 0 7
Indeed, courts have recognized that Congress
"certainly can invite the states to act on its behalf
in carrying out [the 1996 Act].""'° Congress, however, cannot force the state commission to act. In
Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the federal government's authority to require state action.' 0 9 Printz involved the federal
government directing, through the Brady Act,
state law enforcement officers to administer a federal regulatory scheme whereby local officers
were ordered to perform background checks for
gun purchases. 110 The Court held that "the
102

Generally, as discussed more fully below, because not

all state commissions may have jurisdiction to mandate unbundling, due to lack of authority in their enabling statutes,

there is a risk that a particular state may never actually conduct a UNE review.
103
See MCI v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 343

(7th Cir. 2000) ("Because the state commissions are given a
choice whether to participate in federal regulation, the Act
cannot be said impermissibly to 'commandeer' state regulatory agencies to enforce federal law.").
104
See47 U.S.C. §252(e) (6) (providing that an aggrieved
party's only remedy if the state commission fails to act is to
pursue its challenge to the agreement with the Commission).
If, however, the state commission makes a determination,
then that decision may be appealed to the appropriate federal district court. See id.
105
See AT&T v. BellSouth, 238 F.3d 636, 646 (5th Cir.

2001) (stating that the "Act permissibly offers state regulatory
agencies a limited mission, which they may accept or decline:
to apply federal law and regulations as arbitrators and ancil-

Federal Government may not compel the States to
'implement,' by legislation or executive action,
federal regulatory programs."'" More precisely,
"[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the states' officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program."' 12 The
Court reasoned that the Brady Act violated the
constitutional system of dual sovereignty, i.e., the
Constitution empowers only the president to execute the laws, and Congress generally cannot
force state governments to absorb the financial
burden of implementing a federal regulatory program. Thus, under Printz, while the Commission
may request the state commission to act, it does
not appear that the Commission may order either
state commissions or state legislatures to promulgate or implement any additional unbundling
rules.
III.

CONCLUSION

As discussed above, for those elements which
the Commission cannot conduct a sufficiently
granular analysis, the Triennial Review Order sets
out interim rules that remain effective until the
states, if willing, complete their own granular
fact-finding inquiries using the Commission's trigger tests. Because the Commission, however, can
only define the boundaries of state unbundling efforts, and cannot require the states to act, there
are at least three potential outcomes (assuming
106
For example, the Virginia state commission has declined to resolve petitions to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements, thus requiring the Commission to entertain regulatory responsibility over these disputes. See
Starpower Communications, LLC Petition for Preemption of
Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation Commission
Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd.
11277 (2000); see generally Kristin Calabrese, Does State Participation in Regulation Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act Constitute a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1127
(2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's preference for finding sovereign immunity in the context of appeals of state arbitration decisions).
107
See MCI, 222 F.3d at 343.
108
See, e.g., id. at 343 (recognizing the role of the states
as a "deputized" federal regulator).
1o9 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).

110

See id. at 902-03.

lary regulators within the federal system and on behalf of

111

See id. at 925-26.

Congress").

112

Id. at 935 (citations omitted).
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The third outcome, with the Commission conducting, for example, route-by-route transport inquiries, has the potential to create a significant
burden on the Commission, particularly because
many states have several incumbent LEC territories with each territory containing wide ranging
customer market characteristics. At the end of
the day, however, this possibility is unlikely given
that the states heavily lobbied the Commission
during the TriennialReview proceeding for an increased role in unbundling. That is, based on
their stated willingness to enter the fray, particularly with regard to consideration of local circuit

switching, it appears likely that the states will not
hesitate to conduct their own TriennialReview pro1
ceedings. 15
Undoubtedly, the courts will be forced to consider the validity of every provision of the Triennial Review Order, including the Commission's refinement of the impairment standard interpretation. Indeed, one need look no further than the
Chairman's dissent to the Triennial Review Order
for a laundry list of issues that the courts will consider.11 6 Only after the courts have resolved (1)
whether the Commission has properly interpreted
the Act's impairment standard; (2) whether the
Commission has reached reasonable conclusions
regarding whether impairment exists on a nationwide level; and (3) whether the Commission must
perform the granular analysis itself or may delegate the authority to the states to both add and
remove UNEs, will industry participants have the
certainty that they have desperately sought since
1996. Moreover, these issues must be determined
in this order because the new impairment standard is the foundation for both the Commission's
conclusions and the forthcoming state proceedings. Only after the impairment standard is upheld will the courts be able to consider the validity
of the Commission's delegation of a detailed
fact-finding role to the states.
Lastly, the courts will likely address whether the
Commission's instructions to the states are sufficiently precise so that the states can perform the
requisite analysis. Prior to the TriennialReview Order, states had relatively unfettered authority to require additional unbundling of UNEs, but not to
remove UNEs from the Commission's national
7
list. I
Moreover, before the Triennial Review Order, the Commission provided little guidance for

113 Although the Triennial Review Order does not use the
term "presumptively" to describe its rebuttable findings of
impairment, Chairman Powell, in his dissent, disagrees with
the Commission's finding that hot cut switching is "presumptively broken." TriennialReview Order, supranote 3, at 5 (separate Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
114
An additional potential delay in state action arises in
the context of state commissions that have not been given
the express authority under their respective enabling acts to
order unbundling. In these cases, the outcome may depend
on whether the enabling legislation is sufficiently ambiguous
so as not to prevent the state commission from implementing
unbundling proceedings. See PhilipJ. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor CooperativeFederalism, 79 N.C. L. REv.
663, 679-80 (2001) (discussing "whether state agencies
should be presumptively authorized to implement federal
law where state enabling legislation is otherwise ambiguous

on the topic").
115
See Gayle Kansagor & Margaret Boles, NARUC Task
Force Forges Ahead with 'Triennial Review' Analysis, TRDAILy,
Aug. 23, 2003, at 6 (describing various state commissions' efforts to open proceedings consistent with the TriennialReview
Order).
116 See generally TriennialReview Order, supra note 3 (separate Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell criticizing
the majority's findings with regard to mass market switching
and unbundling for ignoring record evidence). In addition
to the appeals of the TriennialReview Order itself, the Commission's resources will also be taxed by appeals of its eventual
pre-emption decisions. Harding &Jamieson, supra note 101,
at 557-58 (arguing that federal courts should defer to swift
Commission assessment and adjudication of preemption petitions).
117 See, e.g., Comments to TriennialReview Order, supra note

the Commission's rules withstand judicial scrutiny). First, if the Commission finds, with respect
to a certain UNE, that impairment exists nationwide, then there is nothing left for the states to
decide regarding that UNE, e.g., residential analog voice loops remain unbundled. Incumbent
LECs seeking to remove unbundling requirements for these UNEs must wait until the Commission's next UNE review proceeding. Second,
if the Commission finds nationwide impairment
does not exist (in the case of mass market switching), or exists (in the case of enterprise loops and
transport), and the state rebuts these findings,
then parties believing that a particular state unbundling determination is inconsistent with the
limits of Section 251(d) (3) and the Commission's
rules, may seek a declaratory ruling from the
Commission seeking to require the states to
amend their decisions to conform with the Commission's. 113 Third, if the states refuse to act,
then parties may petition the Commission to take
the place of the state. In this case, the Commission will perform the granular fact-finding analysis.

114
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the states other than two flawed interpretations of
the impairment standard that were rejected by the
Iowa Utils. Bd. and USTA courts. Now, in the interest of creating certainty that will stabilize the industry, bring renewed investment, and increase
sustained competition, the Commission has provided tests that are intended to be administratively practical for states to apply.'I18 In doing so,
states will conduct proceedings that reveal actual
deployment with regard to the particular markets,

routes, and equipment that competitive LECs are
employing. Thus, regardless of the outcome of
any appeals, these state inquiries may very well
produce state records that show a clearer, more
"granular" picture of the local market." 9 Ultimately, armed with such a record, the Commission would be far better prepared at the outset of
either the next scheduled review of its rules or any
remand from the courts.

30, at 8 n.16 (describing the additional unbundling proceedings of several state commissions).

tion of universal service Linder Section 254).

I 18

Under Section

254, the Commission has established an explicit mandatory
federal universal mechanism that does not preclude the creation of state universal service funds. See, e.g., Federal-State

See, e.g., 7iennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 6.
See Mark P. Trinchero & Holly Rachel Smith, Federal
Preemption of State Universal Service Regulations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 303, 317-18

Joint Board on Universal Senice, Ninth Report and Order and
Eighteenth Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 20432 (1999),

(1999) (describing the history of the Commission's preemp-

rev'd, Qwest Corp. v. F.C.C., 258 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2001).
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